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PREFERENTIAL RIGHT PROVISIONS AND THEIR
APPLICABILITY TO OIL AND GAS INSTRUMENTS
by Harlan Abright
An important, yet often overlooked, provision commonly included in oil
and gas instruments, particularly joint operating agreements,' farm-out
agreements, 2 and unit operating agreements,3 is one providing for a prefer-
ential right to purchase.4 Known also as a "right of first refusal,"5 a "pre-
1. A joint operating agreement is a contract whereby two or more parties agree to
share the costs and benefits of developing a parcel of land for oil or gas production. See,
e.g., the preferential right provision in AMERICAN AsS'N OF PETROLEUM LANDMEN, MODEL
FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT 12 (Form 610-1977) [hereinafter cited as MODEL FORM OP-
ERATING AGREEMENT].
2. A farm-out agreement is
[a] very common form of agreement between operators, whereby the owner of
a lease not desirous of drilling at the time agrees to assign the lease, or some
portion of it (in common or in severalty) to another operator who is desirous
of drilling the tract. The assignor in such a deal may or may not retain an
overriding royalty or production payment. The primary characteristic of the
farm out is the obligation of the assignee to drill one or more wells on the
assigned acreage as a prerequisite to completion of the transfer to him.
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 211 (1977).
3. Unit operating agreements are entered into by parties with interests in land which,
by statute, must be developed as a unit in order to increase the ultimate recovery of oil or
gas. See, e.g., AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, MODEL FORM OF UNIT OPERATING
AGREEMENT FOR STATUTORY UNITIZATION (1974).
4. The following form illustrates a typical preferential right clause in a joint operating
agreement:
In the event any party desires to sell all or any part of his or its interest subject
to this agreement, the other party or parties hereto shall have a preferential
right to purchase the same. In such event, the selling party shall promptly
communicate to the other party or parties hereto the offer received by him or
it from a prospective purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase the same,
together with the name and address of such prospective purchaser, and said
party or parties shall thereupon have an option for a period of ten (10) days
after the receipt of said notice to purchase such undivided interest for the ben-
efit of such remaining parties hereto as may agree to purchase the same. Any
interest so acquired by more than one party hereto, shall be shared by the
parties purchasing the same in the proportions that the interest of each party
so acquiring bears to the total interest of all parties so acquiring. The limita-
tions of this paragraph shall not apply where any party hereto desires to mort-
gage his or its interest or to dispose of his or its interest by merger,
reorganization, consolidation or sale of all his or its assets, or a sale of his or
its interest hereunder to a subsidiary or parent company or subsidiary of a
parent company or to any company in which any one party hereto owns a
majority of the stock.
In event of a sale by Operator of the interests owned by it which are subject
hereto, the holders of a majority interest in the premises subject hereto shall be
entitled to select a new operator but unless such selection is made the trans-
feree of the present Operator shall act as operator hereunder.
H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS 875-76 app. (3d ed. 1974).
5. Wellmore Builders, Inc. v. Wannier, 49 N.J. Super. 456, 140 A.2d 422 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1958); Peters v. Howard, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 641 (1963); Kintner v. Wruble, 17 Pa.
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emptive right,"6 or a "conditional or contingent right,"7 these clauses
provide that when the owner of an interest burdened with such right
desires to sell the property, the holder of the right must be given the first
opportunity to buy on the terms provided in the agreement.' Usually the
terms require that the holder match the best offer received from a prospec-
tive third party purchaser. Technically a preferential right provision is
materially different from an ordinary option in that a preferential right
gives the holder no power to force a sale. Instead, the holder is merely
given the right of purchase in the event the owner of the burdened interest
decides to sell.9
A preferential right provision may be valuable in an oil and gas instru-
ment for two major reasons. First, the presence of such a provision in an
agreement gives the holder of the right a potential opportunity to make
valuable future acquisitions. In joint operating agreements, for example,
each party naturally believes that the interests owned by the other parties
are of some value. The preferential right, therefore, assures each of them
an opportunity to purchase those valuable interests should the owner de-
sire to sell. A second purpose for including a preferential right is to pro-
vide the holder a measure of control over who will be involved in the
operation and development of property in which he has some interest.' °
Many difficulties, however, can arise from carelessly accepting a preferen-
tial right provision as a boilerplate clause without first recognizing the
D. & C.2d 574 (1958); Bennett Veneer Factories, Inc. v. Brewer, 73 Wash. 2d 849, 441 P.2d
128 (1968).
6. Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958);
Draper v. Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966); 54 MICH. L. REV. 1006 (1956).
7. Kintner v. Wruble, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 574 (1958).
8. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 428.3 (1977); 51
C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 88(2), at 267 (1968); 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §
369, at 386 (1970); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 701, 703, 710 (1965).
9. See Nelson v. Reisner, 51 Cal. 2d 161, 165, 331 P.2d 17, 20 (1958). A concise
discussion of the differences between a preferential right and an option is found in 6 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (A. Casner ed. 1952):
A preemption differs materially from an option. An option creates in the
optionee a power to compel the owner of the property to sell it at a stipulated
price whether or not he be willing to part with ownership. A preemption does
not give the preemptioner the power to compel an unwilling owner to sell; it
merely requires the owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer the property
first to the person entitled to the preemption, at the stipulated price. Upon
receiving such an offer the preemptioner may elect whether he will buy. If he
elects not to buy, then the owner may sell to anyone.
10. For example, one party to a joint operating agreement might be contemplating the
sale of his interest to a third party who could frustrate the development of the entire project
or cause it to be directed along paths the others oppose. The preferential right provision,
therefore, gives parties a valuable tool with which to prevent frustration of their plans and
protect their interests. See Meyer v. Warner, 104 Ariz. 44, 448 P.2d 394 (1968) (purpose of
preferential right clause held to be to protect the holder of the right's continuing interest in
the burdened property). In other oil and gas instruments, preferential right provisions can
also be a valuable part of the consideration for entering the agreement. For example, an
integrated producer-refiner might desire such clauses as a device to obtain additional pro-
duction. A natural gas purchaser might desire such a clause in the gas purchase contract
with regard to additional volumes discovered by the seller in order to fill its constant de-
mand for additional supplies. See Reasoner, Preferential Purchase Rights in Oil and Gas
Instruments, 46 TExAs L. REV. 57, 58 (1967).
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ramifications which could flow from its inclusion. One such problem is
that potential purchasers may not wish to bear the expense of investigating
a property for purchase when they know they might be preempted. Fur-
ther, even if a proper sale is made to a third party, an obstinate preferential
right holder may refuse to release the right or acknowledge its waiver,
thereby creating a cloud on the title. Also, a preferential right may pre-
clude the owner of the burdened interest from taking advantage of multi-
interest transactions or like-kind exchanges by limiting his power of alien-
ation. '
Coventurers should likewise be aware that the presence of a preferential
right provision in a joint operating agreement may be evidence in support
of an argument that the parties to the agreement contracted away their
rights to partition the property. In cases involving co-owners of mineral
estates courts have uniformly held that a preferential right provision indi-
cated that the normally absolute right to partition had been contracted
away.' 2 Other provisions, such as nonconsent clauses and co-owner as-
signment rights prior to abandonment, may be the only avenues available
to an owner who does not wish to participate further in the venture.
Care is therefore necessary when considering inclusion of a preferential
right. This Comment deals with the following three major areas of con-
cern which have arisen in connection thereto: (1) the question of the basic
validity or enforceability of a preferential right provision; (2) the applica-
tion of valid provisions to various transactions; and (3) the obligations con-
current with a preferential right, and the remedies and defenses relating to
a breach thereof.' 3 The Comment concludes with a checklist of consider-
ations necessary to the drafting of valid and practical preferential right
provisions. An appendix follows with a sample provision drafted with
these considerations in mind.
I. VALIDITY
If parties specifically desire the inclusion of a preferential right clause in
an agreement, a provision must be drafted which is valid and enforceable.
On the other hand, if a party bound by a preferential right clause wishes to
escape its requirements, he must consider an attack upon its validity.
Thus, in both drafting preferential right provisions and litigating disputes
11. See, e.g., Jones, Problems Presented by Joint Ownership of Oil, Gas and Other
Minerals, 32 TEXAs L. REV. 697, 724 (1954); Oberwetter, The Sale and Purchasing of Pro-
ducing Properties, 9 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 403, 416 (1964).
12. See Sibley v. Hill, 331 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, no writ); Odstrcil
v. McGlaun, 230 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1950, no writ); Warner v. Winn,
191 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally 68
C.J.S. Partition § 44, at 66 (1950).
13. Many, if not most, of the cases referred to in this Comment, it should be noted, did
not arise out of oil and gas transactions, but rather out of landlord-tenant and other ordinary
real property transactions involving preferential right provisions. Since these provisions are
nothing more than a contract right, the same basic principles have been applied to oil and
gas instruments in the cases that have considered the matter. See generally Sellingsloh,




that arise thereunder, attention must be given to the basic validity of the
clause. Essentially, the validity of these provisions has hinged on three
grounds: 4 the Statute of Frauds, the Rule Against Restraints on Aliena-
tion, and the Rule Against Perpetuities.
A. The Statute of Frauds
Precedent has clearly established that preferential purchase right agree-
ments relating to mineral estates must meet the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds. 5 Thus, these provisions may be found invalid under the Stat-
ute because they are contracts to make a future contract with no specifica-
tion of terms.' 6 Similarly, in preferential purchase right provisions in
which the price is to be determined from a third party offer, an argument
may be made that the provision renders the contract partly in parol and
thereby void under the Statute.' 7 Contrary to this argument, however, is
the general rule that the Statute of Frauds is satisfied if the agreement
prescribes a method that will result in a certain determination of the
purchase price. Preferential right clauses providing that the holder shall
have the right to purchase at the same price set in a bona fide third party
offer are held to meet this standard.' 8 Although a very few courts have
held that a preferential right provision implies that the purchase price will
be determined by a third party offer,' 9 the provision should always clearly
state the manner of ascertaining the purchase price, or risk being struck
down as merely an agreement to make a future contract. 20
14. Other grounds upon which the validity of preferential purchase rights have been
unsuccessfully attacked include uncertainty of price, uncertainty of time of accrual of right
to exercise, lack of consideration, and lack of mutuality. See Annot., 136 A.L.R. 138
(1942).
15. See Cherry v. Salinas, 355 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962,
writ refd n.r.e.); Noxon v. Cockburn, 147 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1941, writ refd). See also Watkins v. Arnold, 60 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1933, writ refd) (option contracts relating to land are within the Statute
of Frauds).
16. See Stekoll Petroleum Co. v. Hamilton, 152 Tex. 182, 190, 255 S.W.2d 187, 192
(1953) (a contract to apportion an oil and gas lease "in an equitable pattern" is an agreement
to make a future agreement voidable under the Statute of Frauds); Taber v. Pettus Oil &
Ref. Co., 139 Tex. 395, 398, 162 S.W.2d 959, 962 (1942) (agreement to convey oil and gas
leases in future using the "regular Texas Standard Form No. 86" is void under the Statute of
Frauds because the agreement failed to set out essential terms); Noxon v. Cockburn, 147
S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd) (agreement to convey oil and
gas lease is void under the Statute of Frauds).
17. See Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle Co., 141 F. 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 201
U.S. 646 (1905); Marske v. Willard, 169 Ill. 276, 48 N.E. 290 (1897).
18. See Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 3, 27 N.W.2d 320, 322 (1947); Barling v. Horn,
296 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Mo. 1956); Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 897, 290 S.W.2d 76, 78 (1956);
Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J. Super. 348, 349, 170 A.2d 488, 493 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 36 N.J. 32, 174 A.2d 658 (1961); Parker v. Murphy, 152 Va. 173, 184, 146 S.E. 254,
258 (1929). See generally IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 261, at 470 (1950); Annot., 136
A.L.R. 138 (1942).
19. See R.F. Robinson Co. v. Drew, 83 N.H. 459, 144 A. 67 (1928); Parker v. Murphy,
152 Va. 173, 184, 146 S.E. 254, 258 (1929).
20. See Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 515, 14 N.E. 741, 743 (1888); Hardy v. Galloway,
111 N.C. 53, 15 S.E. 890 (1892).
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Thus, with proper draftsmanship, a preferential right provision will in
most circumstances meet the validity requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. A problem may arise, however, if a preferential right clause is
held to be applicable to a package-deal situation wherein the owner desires
to sell the burdened interest as a part of a larger group of properties. E1
Often no rational basis for allocating any particular portion of the
purchase price to the specific burdened property can be made because the
value of oil and gas interests as a whole greatly exceeds the sum of their
individual values. Hence, when a preferential right provision fails to
specify a certain method for determining the price of the covered property
in such situations, there is some risk that the provision will be found void
for uncertainty under the Statute of Frauds. Therefore, if the parties to an
agreement containing a preferential right provision want coverage of pack-
age-deal sales, care must be taken to set up some definite formula for de-
termining the price to be paid by the holder in that event.22
B. The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation
The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation reflects a policy decision of
the courts that they will not look favorably upon agreements which tend to
restrict a party's power to transfer his property freely. Undeniably, prefer-
ential right provisions restrict alienability to some extent. For instance,
the owner of a burdened interest is deprived of the absolute freedom in
selecting the party to whom he will convey his property. Similarly, the
applicability of the right to package deals may restrict the owner's ability
to enter into such transactions. The generally accepted view, however, is
that restraints of this nature are indirect and ancillary to a legitimate pur-
pose.23 As stated in the original Restatement of Property, in most prefer-
ential right provisions "[t]he interference with alienation . . is so slight
that the major policies furthered by the freedom of alienation are not in-
fringed to a degree which requires invalidation.,, 24  Perhaps the most real-
istic view was expressed by a Florida district court of appeals in the recent
case of Watergate Corp. v. Regan:25 "[Allienability is not restrained at all,
21. The problems relating to the applicability of preferential right provisions to package
deals are discussed in a later section of this Comment. See notes 90-105 infra and accom-
panying text.
22. See Appendix, note m infra.
23. A court will probably invalidate a preferential right provision under the Rule
Against Restraints on Alienation if the restraint itself, and not some reasonable commercial
purpose, was the primary reason for the inclusion of the provisions. See, e.g., Kershner v.
Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo. 1955).
24. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(1), Comment c at 2443 (1944). This proposition
has been generally subscribed to by the courts in cases of preferential right provisions which
provide that the holder may buy at a price offered by a third party. See Weber v. Texas
Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936); Torrea v. Umphress, 27 Ariz.
App. 513, 556 P.2d 814 (1976) (holding that a preferential right provision did not constitute
an invalid restraint on alienation); Blair v. Kingsly, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1951) (option to
repurchase); Watergate Corp. v. Regan, 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Sibley v.
Hill, 331 S.W1.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, no writ); Kames State Bank v. Bour-
geois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963) (option to repurchase).
25. 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
19781
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but is in fact enhanced because the seller has two potential buyers instead
of one."26
On the other hand, a preferential right provision with more restrictive
conditions, such as requiring sale at a specified price, which may be far less
than market value, or placing restrictions on prospective purchasers, will
probably be held void.2 7 In addition, the provision may be challenged on
the basis that a primary purpose of the Rule is to prevent restrictions
which inhibit the development of property.28 Thus, since burdening a
working interest, as opposed to a nonoperating interest,29 with a preferen-
tial right might in some instances inhibit the owner's ability to enter cer-
tain transactions, for example, package deals,3° the preferential right
provision may inhibit development and impose an invalid restraint on
alienation.
Nevertheless, in Knight v. Chicago Corp.3 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a royalty owner could place restraints on the alienability of a
working interest even though it had the effect of diluting the value of the
working interest.3 2  Similarly, Sibley v. Hill33 more recently held that
working interests held by cotenants can be subject to a preferential
purchase right held by the other cotenants.34 Neither of these cases, how-
ever, considered this question in relation to multi-interest package deals,
and while the chances for the success of this "restraint" argument appear
slight, the proposition has never been specifically tested in court. Under
the right circumstances and in the right jurisdiction, a sufficient restraint
may be found so as to invalidate a preferential right provision. This possi-
bility should at least be kept in mind when drafting a provision, although,
as stated earlier, the trend of most courts today is to validate preferential
purchase right clauses notwithstanding the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation as long as the provision does not contain any unreasonable or
especially burdensome restrictions.
C. The Rule Against Perpetuities
The final and most persuasive argument respecting the validity of pref-
erential right provisions concerns the applicability of the Rule Against Per-
petuities. Practically every state has some form of the Rule.35 Basically,
the Rule requires that an estate or interest, in order to be good, must vest,
26. Id. at 136.
27. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 26.67, at 510; L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154, at 62 (2d ed. 1956). But see Mattern v.
Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. 1963).
28. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 26.3.
29. See note 89 infra.
30. See notes 90-105 infra and accompanying text.
31. 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564 (1945).
32. Id. at 104-05, 188 S.W.2d at 566-67.
33. 331 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, no writ).
34. The court summarily rejected the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation arguments
on two grounds: that the absolute right to sell was unaffected and that such restraints are not
unusual. Id. at 229.
35. See 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities §§ 38-71 (1951).
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if at all, within the period of some life or lives in being at the effective date
of the instrument creating the future interest or twenty-one years thereaf-
ter.36 In a preferential right provision in an oil and gas instrument, since
the holder is given a conditional right to specific performance, the possible
vesting of an estate, if unlimited or merely limited to the duration of an
unlimited oil and gas lease, could occur well beyond the period permitted
by the Rule.37
In Watergate Corp. v. Regan38 the purchaser of property had a preferen-
tial right to buy contiguous property owned by the grantor. The court
held that whether the preferential right would necessarily vest within the
period required by the Rule would depend on a factual issue: whether the
obligation to honor the right is personal to the original owner of the bur-
dened estate. If the obligation is personal, if it applies only if that owner
elects to sell, then such preferential right would necessarily vest within the
required period.39  But if the preferential right follows into the hands of
the owner's heirs, devisees, or grantees, then the Rule would be violated
since vesting would not necessarily occur within the required period.'
The court went on to state that deciding whether a preferential right was
intended to be personal, in the absence of a dispositive declaration in the
clause, requires a determination of the intentions of the parties from ex-
trinsic evidence. In the absence of such evidence, and faced with ambigu-
ity, the court said a construction would be adopted which would uphold
the provision rather than one that would invalidate it.4" On the other
hand, preferential right provisions that provide no limit for their applica-
tion, or that can be construed to be not personal, may be held unenforce-
able.42
Other authorities, however, view the Rule Against Perpetuities as merely
another aspect of the policy against restraints on alienation and believe
that application should not occur where "practical alienability" of land is
36. See Adams v. Videl, 60 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1952); Kettler v. Atkinson, 383 S.W.2d 557,
561 (Tex. 1964); Singer v. Singer, 150 Tex. 115, 123, 237 S.W.2d 600, 605 (1951). See
generally Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1965); Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938).
37. Jones, Problems Presented by Joint Ownership of Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals, 32
TEXAS L. REV. 697, 723 (1954); Reasoner, supra note 10, at 65; see Neustadt v. Pearce, 145
Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437 (1958).
38. 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
39. See, e.g., Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957); Points v. Barnes, 301 So.
2d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1975); Campbell v.
Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950); Kershner v. Hurlbert, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.
1955).
40. This approach was taken in another recent case, Atchison v. City of Englewood, 170
Colo. 295, 463 P.2d 297 (1970). Here a preemptive right to repurchase was determined to be
invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities since the right to repurchase was specifically
retained by the holder's heirs and assigns, and was unlimited as to time.
41. 321 So. 2d at 136; see 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities § 8 (1972); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 375 (1944).
42. See, e.g., Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E.2d 392 (1940) (preferential right
clause held invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities because the clause fixed no certain
time for its operation).
1978]
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not impaired.43 Under this pragmatic approach courts should be less will-
ing to strike down for technical reasons provisions which serve commer-
cially reasonable purposes, as do preferential right provisions in many
instances." This position has been upheld by a number of courts which
held that preferential right provisions do not come within the scope of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. 5 The most recent application of this principle
was in the case of Foster t. Bullard.4 6 With regard to this issue, a Texas
court of civil appeals, following several Texas precedents, held:
In general it may be said that a perpetuity is a limitation that takes the
subject property out of commerce for a long period of time and works
an indirect restraint on alienation ...
Under the facts of this case Bullard and his land company were not
restrained from free alienation. . . . Foster's [preferential right] was
not exclusive to him to buy at a fixed price which he could exercise at
some remote time beyond the limit of the rule against perpetu-
ities. . . . Foster had only the right to reject or to buy at such time as
Bullard was ready to sell. The contract does not fall within the rule
against perpetuities.47
Weber v. Texas Co.48 indicates that the federal courts take a similar
stance. Some authorities have flatly stated that even if perpetual in dura-
tion, preferential rights are not objectionable under the Rule since free
alienation is not really restrained. 9 Likewise, other commentators have
said that the Rule Against Perpetuites is not a satisfactory device by which
the invalidity of preemptive rights should be determined in implementing
public policy." Based on this reasoning, this pragmatic approach appears
to be the best analysis for reflecting consideration of commercial realities.
Nevertheless, when drafting a preferential right provision, a technical vio-
lation of the Rule must be carefully avoided to prevent problems that
could occur in a jurisdiction following the Watergate line of cases.5
43. See Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities III, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 419, 452 (1949); Reasoner, supra note 10, at 68.
44. The Supreme Court of Texas followed this reasoning in Kelley v. Womack, 153
Tex. 371, 268 S.W.2d 903 (1954).
45. Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936); Windi-
ate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W. 620 (1929); Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.); Sibley v. Hill, 331 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1960, no writ). See also the authorities cited in Martin v. Lott, 482 S.W.2d 917, 920
n.I (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ).
46. 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.).
47. Id. at 735.
48. 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936). This court held that the
underlying reason for the Rule is to avoid burdening real property with restrictions which
would isolate the property and exclude it from commerce for long periods of time.
49. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 26.66; L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 27, § 1154.
50. See, e.g., Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests." III, 44 YALE
L.J. 1380 (1935).
51. See Appendix, notes h, p & q infra for examples of a preferential right provision




A. What Is a "Sale"?
Most preferential right provisions are drafted so as to be triggered by a
"sale." 52 Because of the broad range of interpretations that can be de-
rived from that term,53 the determination of which transfers will trigger the
preferential right is difficult.5 In making this determination, courts have
generally placed emphasis on either the presence or absence of arm's
length dealing between the owner of the burdened interest and the third
party transferee5 5 or upon the effect of the conveyance as placing the prop-
erty beyond the reach of the holder of the right.
5 6
Thus, where circumstances reveal a donative intent in a transfer between
relatives, a preferential right may not apply because of the absence of
arm's length dealing. For instance, in Isaacson v. First Security Bank5 7
the owner of a burdened interest conveyed the interest to his son for one-
third of its fair market value. The court determined that the circum-
stances indicated that the transfer was more in the nature of a gift than a
sale. Consequently, the preferential right provision was held inapplicable
to the transaction. 8 Similarly, an absence of arm's length dealing in
transactions between commercially related parties is also generally held to
preclude the application of preferential right provisions.59 Thus, courts
have ruled that a triggering sale has not occurred when a burdened prop-
erty is transferred to the owner's wholly owned corporation or from one
corporation to another, both of which are owned and controlled by the
owner of the interest.6' Following the same reasoning, a federal court
held that where a corporation owned the burdened interest, the sale of all
the corporation's stock did not constitute a sale that would invoke a prefer-
ential right provision.6' More recently, a New York court in Torrey Deliv-
52. For example, the preferential right provision in most standard joint operating agree-
ments provides: "In the event any party desires to sell all or part of his or its interest subject
to this agreement, the other party or parties hereto shall have a preferential right to purchase
the same." H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 875 app.
53. See 38 WORDS AND PHRASES Sale 70-214 (1967).
54. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 203 (1976).
55. See Kroehnke v. Zimmerman, 171 Colo. 365,467 P.2d 265 (1970); Isaacson v. First
Security Bank, 95 Idaho 452, 511 P.2d 269 (1973); Sand v. London & Co., 39 N.J. Super.
513, 121 A.2d 559 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956).
56. See Anderson v. Armour & Co., 205 Kan. 801, 473 P.2d 84 (1970).
57. 95 Idaho 452, 511 P.2d 269 (1973).
58. But see Ogle v. Hubble, I Cal. App. 357, 82 P. 217 (1905).
59. This lack of arm's length dealing is often specifically mentioned in the standard
provisions:
However, there shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases where
any party wishes ... to dispose of its interests by merger, reorganization, con-
solidation, or sale of all or substantially all of its assets to a subsidiary or
parent company or to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in
which any one party owns a majority of the stock.
MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 12.
60. See Kroehnke v. Zimmerman, 171 Colo. 365, 467 P.2d 265 (1970).
61. Gambell v. Cornell Oil Co., 154 F. Supp. 581, 588 & n.19 (W.D. Okla. 1957), aj'd,
260 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1958).
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ery, Inc. v. Chatauqua Truck Sales & Service, Inc. 62 determined that a
merger of two corporations did not constitute a triggering sale. The sur-
viving corporation, however, was held to be bound by the preferential
right clause. Logically, the same conclusion should hold true for all the
transferees in the above described transactions.63 Finally, courts have also
held that the granting of an easement on burdened property does not trig-
ger the preferential right provision.64
Problems have been encountered in determining whether an exchange
of the burdened property for consideration other than cash, such as an
exchange of properties, is a "sale." For instance, a person or corporation
may acquire another unrelated corporation or partnership through merger
or purchase by stock swap, resulting in a claim from a third party that it
had a preferential right to purchase certain assets of the acquired party.
Under such circumstances, if the preferential right is determined to be ap-
plicable, the acquiring party may be compelled to disgorge the burdened
property or undertake to unravel a consummated merger or purchase.65
A federal court in Panuco Oil Leases, Inc. v. Conroe Drilling Co. 66 held
that an exchange was not a sale and refused to enforce a preferential right
provision contained in a farm-out agreement. In that case a burdened
working interest was assigned to a third party in consideration of an agree-
ment to drill. This transaction was held to be an exchange, not a sale, and
consequently the preferential right did not apply. The opposite result,
however, was reached in the later case of Anderson v. Armour CO. 67  A
triggering sale was held to have occurred in a transaction involving an
exchange of properties. The decision was based on two grounds: a nar-
row, technical ground and a broader, pragmatic policy ground. Even
though the transaction was primarily an exchange, the deed said "bargain,
sell and convey," and so was technically a "sale."68 More persuasive was
the court's reasoning with regard to the realistic effect of the transaction.
As a practical matter, as far as the holder of the right was concerned, the
property had effectively been "sold" and placed beyond his reach, regard-
less of the details of the deal.69 Thus, the right was held to apply in order
to protect his interests.
This "beyond the reach of the holder" rationale is the better analysis for
determining whether an exchange constitutes a triggering sale. Of course,
this analysis again involves the question whether the preferential right pro-
vision is personal or runs with the land. If a jurisdiction accepts the the-
62. 47 App. Div. 2d 279, 366 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1975).
63. Problems may arise in this context, however, with respect to the Rule Against Per-
petuities. See the discussion of whether a preferential right is personal, and the consequent
ramifications, in notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text.
64. See Wellmore Builders, Inc. v. Wannier, 49 N.J. Super. 456, 457, 140 A.2d 422, 427
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958).
65. See Appendix, note n infra and accompanying text.
66. 202 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
67. 205 Kan. 801, 473 P.2d 84 (1970).




ory that a preferential right can run with the land without violating the
Rule, an exchange should not trigger a provision drafted in terms of a
"sale." On the other hand, if a jurisdiction subscribes to the theory that a
valid preferential right cannot run with the land, but must be personal, an
exchange should constitute a triggering sale because such transaction effec-
tively places the burdened interest beyond the reach of the holder to the
complete frustration of the right.
A final problem in this area concerns an exception to the preferential
right contained in most standard forms. This provision excepts the prefer-
ential right in the event of the owner's disposition of the property by the
sale of all his assets.7° Questions arise concerning the actual scope of this
phrase. Does this exception require a sale of all assets, personal and busi-
ness, no matter how unrelated they may be to the particular agreement?
Further, does it require the sale of all assets to a single purchaser, a partic-
ularly remote possibility in the case of a large corporation?7 This ambi-
guity can be prevented by incorporating the intentions of the parties with
respect to this matter into the provision when drafted.72 Even in transac-
tions that are clearly sales, however, questions can still arise as to the ap-
plicability of a preferential right provision.
B. Involuntary Sales
Most authorities consider preferential right provisions to apply only to
"voluntary" sales. 73 The context in which the question of the applicability
of preferential rights to "involuntary sales" most often arises involves
mortgage foreclosure sales. The leading case in this area is Draper v.
Gochman,74 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a trustee's sale
upon a mortgage foreclosure was "involuntary," and thus not one to which
the preferential right was applicable. The purchaser at the foreclosure
sale, however, stepped into the shoes of the previous owner, and had to
honor the preferential right in any subsequent sale. 75 Once again, the de-
cision was based on both technical and logical grounds. The plaintiff ar-
gued that the execution of the deed of trust to the burdened interest was
itself a sale. The court responded that this transaction did not pass title to
the property; the title remained in the owner, and the holder of the deed
70. See, e.g., MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 12: "However,
there shall be no preferential right to purchase in these cases where any party wishes ... to
dispose of its interests by ... sale of all or substantially all of its assets .
71. See Sellingsloh, supra note 13, at 41 & n.8.
72. For example, see how this is handled in the Appendix, note p infra and accompany-
ing text.
73. See Kowalsky v. Familia, 71 Misc. 2d 287, 336 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (emi-
nent domain proceedings); Blankman v. Great W. Food Distribs., Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 754, 293
N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (judicial sales); Draper v. Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex.
1966) (mortgage foreclosure sale); In re Rigby's Estate, 62 Wyo. 401, 167 P.2d 964 (1946)
(sale at public auction by decedent's administrator). See also Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 962
(1968).
74. 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966).
75. Id. at 547.
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merely had a lien.76 Furthermore, the trustee in the foreclosure sale had
no authority to offer the property to anyone except in accordance with the
specific provisions of the deed of trust and the statute governing trustee
sales." Thus, since the deed of trust made no provision for the recogni-
tion of the preferential right, the trustee was not at liberty to offer the
property to the holder of the right in preference over any other foreclosure
bidder.
Embracing a broader reasoning, however, the court also said that the
preferential right clause was inapplicable because the sale was involuntary
in that the owner was not an actor in the transaction.78 When the owner
mortgaged the burdened interest, he had a desire to borrow money rather
than to sell the property; he contemplated repaying the loan. The court
stated: "There is no evidence here that [the] loan transaction with its at-
tendant mortgage or deed of trust was intended as a subterfuge or device
to sell the property so as to defeat [the] first right of refusal."'79 The oppo-
site result was reached in Price v. Town of Ruslon.s° In Price a Louisiana
court placed weight on the fact that the owner voluntarily made the deed
of trust, knowing that it would result in a foreclosure sale. Consequently,
the court found a "transferred intent" in the foreclosure transaction, mak-
ing the sale by the trustee the "voluntary" act of the owner. Hence, the
preferential right provision was held applicable.
Similar conflicts appear in decisions involving other types of involun-
tary sales. The sale of burdened property by the administrator of a de-
ceased owner's estate has been held to be both a triggering sale"' and an
inapplicable involuntary transfer.82 Likewise, "judicial sales" of an estate
including a burdened interest have been found to be both triggering 83 and
nontriggering s4 Other "involuntary" sales have been considered and dis-
posed of without present conflict. Thus, a condemnation sale to a county
government has been held to be so involuntary as not to invoke a preferen-
76. This could be different in a jurisdiction which subscribes to the "title theory" of
mortgages rather than the "lien theory." See, e.g., C. CRIBBET, J. FRITZ & T. JOHNSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 500-01 (1972). In such a jurisdiction, the mortgaging
of a burdened interest might be successfully argued to be a triggering sale. This writer has
found no cases that have considered this issue.
77. 400 S.W.2d at 547.
78. Id. See also Nu-Way Serv. Stations v. Vandenberg Bros. Oil Co., 283 Mich. 551,
278 N.W. 683 (1938).
79. 400 S.W.2d at 547.
80. 171 La. 985, 132 So. 653 (1931).
81. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 159 Cal. App. 2d 184, 323 P.2d 834
(1958) (holder of preferential right granted specific performance against executor).
82. In re Rigby's Estate, 62 Wyo. 401, 167 P.2d 964 (1946) (sale at public auction by
administrator of decedent's estate held not voluntary within the scope of the first refusal
clause).
83. Cities Serv. Oil Corp. v. Estes, 208 Va. 44, 155 S.E.2d 59 (1967) (a judicial sale
should not be distinguished from a private sale in terms of the purpose of the preferential
right provision).
84. Blankman v. Great W. Food Distribs., Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 754, 293 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup.
Ct. 1968) (a first refusal option cannot apply to a judicial sale).
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tial right clause.8 5 Also, an early Canadian case held that a preferential
right provision does apply to a liquidation sale of an insolvent owner of a
burdened interest.
86
Thus, many uncertainties may arise in determining the applicability of a
preferential right to an involuntary sale. The courts should recognize that
a preferential right in an oil and gas instrument often is included to enable
the holder to control, to an extent, who will own the burdened interest. In
light of this intent, any sale should trigger the clause if failure to do so
would tend to frustrate this purpose.87  The ambiguity in this area can
easily be avoided, however, by precise draftsmanship of the preferential
right provision in order to make clear the partys' intentions with respect to
involuntary sales.
s8
C. Sale of Nonoperating Interests
Joint operating agreements usually deal with the obligations and rights
of the owners of working interests. Arguably, a preferential right provi-
sion in such an agreement may not be applicable to the sale of a nonoper-
ating interest that has been carved out of the working interest. 89 The most
equitable way of determining whether these sales come within the scope of
the provision is to consider the purpose that the preferential right was in-
tended to serve.
For instance, the primary purpose of the provision may be to facilitate a
party's ability to increase his interest in properties with which he is famil-
iar and involved. This purpose would be furthered if the preferential right
applied to a sale of a nonoperating interest. On the other hand, if the
purpose of the provision was to give each party some measure of control
over the parties involved in the actual operation and development of the
properties, the preferential right need not apply to sales of nonoperating
interests. Since the transferee of a nonworking interest has no operating
rights or duties, the "control" purpose of the provision would not be fur-
thered by application to these transactions. Unfortunately, the purpose is
seldom so clear and singular in complex oil and gas transactions, and am-
biguity is sure to appear. This problem could be prevented, once again,
by carefully drafting the provision to reflect the intentions of the parties as
to the desired application of the preferential right to sales of nonoperating
interests.9°
85. Kowalsky v. Familia, 71 Misc. 2d 287, 336 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See
generally Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 588 (1962).
86. McCarter v. York County Loan Co., 14 Ont. L.R. 420 (1907).
87. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Appendix, note o infra and accompanying text.
89. A nonoperating interest is one that does not bear a share of operating expenses, but
that shares to some extent in the profits. Three common nonoperating oil and gas interests
are a royalty, an overriding royalty, and a production payment.
90. See Appendix, note a infra and accompanying text.
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D. Applicability to Multi-Interest Transactions
One of the most common oil and gas transactions is the sale of several
mineral interests together in a "package deal."91 If a burdened interest is
part of the package, the deal technically falls within the language com-
monly used in preferential right provisions. A standard provision, how-
ever, does not comprehend multi-interest deals in which no specific offer is
made for the burdened interest and no particular portion of the purchase
price is allocated to it. This is particularly significant in oil and gas trans-
actions because the separate value of an individual portion of a package of
interests is often quite different from a mere pro rata division of the whole
purchase price. The logic seems clear; because various types of package
deals are so basic to the industry, the failure to provide a workable
formula for applying the right to a package deal is arguably evidence that
the parties did not intend the preferential right to apply to such transac-
tions.92 Nevertheless, most courts which have considered the question,
albeit in situations involving other than oil and gas transactions, have held
that a preferential right provision is applicable to a package deal.93
Divergence appears, however, with respect to the remedies available to
protect the holder of the right in package-deal situations, and the various
courts have developed three approaches. First, if the holder of the right is
notified of the proposed package sale before its actual consummation,
some courts will grant an injunction preventing the sale of the burdened
interest unless the holder is given an opportunity to exercise his right.94 If
the holder does not discover the transaction until after it has taken place,
the same courts will usually order a reconveyance of the burdened interest
to the owner, who is then enjoined from subsequent sales unless he honors
the provision.9" None of these courts, however, has been willing to decree
91. A package deal is an oil or gas transaction involving the conveyance of several
adjoining properties in one single price "package." See generally Sellingsloh, supra note
13, at 50.
92. Reasoner, supra note 10, at 72. This view has not as yet been presented to a court.
It used to be followed in New York in situations not involving oil and gas, Sautkulis v.
Conklin, I App. Div. 2d 962, 150 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1956), affdrmem., 2 N.Y.2d 919, 141 N.E.2d
916, 161 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1957) (a preferential right provision found inapplicable to a package
deal), but has since been abandoned, C & B Wholesale Stationery v. S. De Bella Dresses,
Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 579, 349 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1973). Due to the complex nature of oil and
gas transactions, this view might well be persuasive if presented to a court. See Appendix,
note / infra and accompanying text, for a solution to this problem.
93. See Maron v. Howard, 258 Cal. App. 2d 473, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1968); Myers v.
Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1971); Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J. Super. 348, 170 A.2d
488 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 36 N.J. 32, 174 A.2d 658 (1961); C & B Wholesale
Stationery v. S. De Bella Dresses, Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 579, 349 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1973); Duff-
Norton Co. v. Hall, 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Berry-Iverson Co. v. Johnson, 242
N.W.2d 126 (N.D. 1976).
94. Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1971); Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J.
Super. 348, 170 A.2d 488 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 36 N.J. 32, 174 A.2d 658
(1961); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 356 Pa. 226, 51 A.2d 719 (1947); Smith v.
Traxler, 228 S.C. 418, 90 S.E.2d 482 (1955).
95. See Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1971); Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J.
Super. 348, 170 A.2d 488 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 36 N.J. 32, 174 A.2d 658
(1961); C & B Wholesale Stationery v. S. De Bella Dresses, Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 579, 349
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specific performance in favor of the holder of the right.96 Their reasoning
is that the owner's attempt to sell the package of interests is not an indica-
tion of a desire to sell the burdened property separately-the only transac-
tion to which the right applies-at least where no specific value is placed
on that interest. In addition, in the most recent case on this point, Myers
v. Lovelinsky,9 7 the Iowa Supreme Court, in denying specific performance,
drew an analogy between a preferential right and an option. The general
rule as to options is that no specific performance will be decreed unless all
the terms, including price, are specific, or a definite means is provided for
fixing a specific price.98 Thus, in the absence of such a formula, when a
burdened property is sold as a part of a package deal without specifically
pricing the burdened interest, it may be held that the price of that portion
is too indefinite to warrant specific performance. As the court stated, "To
say that the price of the [burdened] premises is an exact portion of the
whole price in proportion to acreage is unwarranted, for the [burdened]
premises may have a considerably different value from a parcel of the
same size elsewhere [within the package]." 99 Although logical, the ulti-
mate equity of such a remedy is questionable. Under this theory denying
specific performance, the burden is on the holder of the right to inform
himself of the proposed transfer and instigate litigation to protect his inter-
ests. Even if the holder wins his case and receives injunctive relief, he has
no concrete or immediate benefit, merely the abstract preservation of his
right. The owner of the burdened interest may then decide against selling
the burdened premises. The result under this approach is that the holder
is forced to initiate and bear the cost of the legal proceedings without re-
ceiving any tangible recovery for his efforts. This hardship could be re-
duced, however, by charging the holder's attorney's fees and costs to the
malfeasant owner of the burdened interest or against a purchaser who took
with notice of the preferential right. Even then, however, the only benefit
is a return to status quo.
Other courts have taken exactly the opposite view with regard to the
appropriateness of specific performance.'°° These courts are willing to fix
a price for the burdened interest, usually by pro rata allocation,' 0 ' and
N.Y.S.2d 751 (1973). None of these decisions, however, has discussed how to determine the
price to be paid on the reconveyance. Also, none has discussed the importance of whether
the third party purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the preferential right.
96. See authorities cited in note 94 supra.
97. 189 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1971).
98. See 49 AM. JUR. 2d Specific Performance § 30, at 48 (1973); 81 C.J.S. Specific
Performance § 47, at 821 (1977).
99. 189 N.W.2d at 576. See also Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J. Super. 348, 170 A.2d 488,
494 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 36 N.J. 32, 174 A.2d 658 (1961) ("the unwarranted
assumption that every acre of the parcel was of equal value").
100. Maron v. Howard, 258 Cal. App. 2d 473, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1968); Wilson v. Brown,
5 Cal. App. 2d 425, 55 P.2d 485 (1936); Denco, Inc. v. Belk, 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957)
(specific performance imposed on buyer who purchased with knowledge that the property
was burdened); Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W.2d 320 (1947); Duff-Norton Co. v.
Hall, 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Berry-Iverson Co. v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126
(N.D. 1976).
101. See, e.g., Maron v. Howard, 258 Cal. App. 2d 473, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1968) (pro rata
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afford the right holder the opportunity to purchase. If he so chooses, the
court will then decree specific performance in his favor. For example, in
Berry-Iverson Co. v. Johnson102 the court determined that specific per-
formance would be more consistent with the intentions of the parties at the
time they entered the agreement.
Finally, a third approach is to recognize the preferential right and allow
the holder to exercise it with respect to the entire package of properties,
assuming all of the property belongs to the owner of the burdened interest.
As yet, this view is adopted only in Virginia" 3 and Missouri." This
analysis is the least satisfactory of the three approaches and the least con-
sistent with the purposes of preferential right provisions.'° 5 In any event,
the uncertainties-pointed out in this subsection can be avoided by drafting
preferential right provisions that specifically detail the desired application
to multi-interest transactions, i6
III. OBLIGATIONS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES ASSOCIATED WITH
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT PROVISIONS
A. Obligations of the Parties
All three parties who may be affected by a preferential right provision
have some duties with respect to it. The owner of the burdened interest
has the greatest responsibility. Essentially, the owner of the property must
notify the holder of the right of a proposed sale and offer him the opportu-
nity to exercise such right should he so desire. ' 07 To reduce controversies
involving the sufficiency of notice, the provision should specifically state
the form of notice required. Refusal of the holder to meet one offer that
the owner himself ultimately rejects does not extinguish the preferential
right; it is a "continuing property right" which attaches to any subsequent
sale. 108 This duty is not satisfied by giving the holder an opportunity
allocation of entire price even though the trial court had evidence of a greater possible mar-
ket value); Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 4, 27 N.W.2d 320, 322 (1947). Other courts
have not specified the means of allocation. Wilson v. Brown, 5 Cal. 2d 425, 55 P.2d 485
(1936); Duff-Norton Co. v. Hall, 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966). See also Annot., 170
A.L.R. 1068 (1955).
102. 242 N.W.2d 126 (N.D. 19"16).
103. First Nat'l Exch. Bank v, Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 764 (1937).
104. Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956).
105. The owner of property subject to a preferential right should not be permitted to
increase unilaterally the consideration required to be paid to exercise the right, whether by
packaging the property or creating extraordinary terms for the exercise of the right. For
instance, what happens when the holder of the right is unable to finance the purchase of the
entire package? Does he lose the right to the burdened interest? Similarly, what if he has
no desire to own the remainder of the package properties? Still another problem arises if
the other portions of the package are burdened by other preferential rights. These questions
would appear to require resort to one of the other possible solutions to this problem, ie.,
injunction, reconveyance, allocation, or specific performance.
106. See Appendix, note m infra and accompanying text.
107. See Hill v. Zuckermen, 138 Mont. 230, 355 P.2d 521 (1960).
108. See Sand v. London & Co., 39 N.J. Super. 513, 121 A.2d 559 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1956); L.E. Wallach, Inc., v. Toll, 381 Pa. 423, 113 A.2d 258 (1955); Foster v. Bullard, 496
S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ refed n.r.e.). But see Pratt v. Prentice,
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merely to make an offer 9 nor by giving the holder an opportunity to buy
at a price greater than that for which the owner subsequently sells." 0
Neither is the obligation fulfilled by offering the holder the opportunity to
purchase on significantly less favorable terms than those available to the
third party."' This situation is especially problematic when the owner is
willing to take a third party's promissory note. Is the owner also obligated
to take the holder's note, even though the holder is a poor credit risk?
This dilemma can be best solved, once again, by precisely drafting a provi-
sion which details the manner in which the financing arrangements of a
third party will affect the right.' 1
2
Another question which may arise concerns the owner's responsibility to
the holder when the third party offer is withdrawn before the holder has
decided whether to exercise his right." 3 This was most recently answered
by a Texas court of civil appeals in Henderson v. Nitschke." 4 In that case
a preferential right provision gave the holder sixty days in which to act.
Specific performance was granted to the holder who exercised his right
within the sixty-day period even though the third party's offer had been
withdrawn. The court reasoned that when the owner gave the holder no-
tice, the preferential right matured into an enforceable option for the entire
period stated in the provision. Since practically every preferential right
clause contains such a time limitation, this case seems to be an equitable
and practical decision. Care must be taken, however, to guard against
collusion in this area. For instance, the holder could cause a third party to
make an offer and then withdraw it for the sole purpose of giving the
holder the right to buy. In such a situation, however, if a holder is found
to be in collusion with a third party, he should not be able to obtain spe-
cific performance because of the equitable "clean hands" doctrine.
In the event of a proposed package sale, the obligation of the owner
would appear to be met, according to Humphrey v. Wood," 5 by his tender-
ing the burdened interest to the right holder at an allocated portion of the
total purchase price proposed." 6 If the holder is not satisfied with such
offer, the owner may be forced to choose among purchasing a waiver of
the preferential right, removing the burdened interest from the package
and possibly frustrating the entire deal," 7 or simply breaching the provi-
166 App. Div. 906, 151 N.Y.S. 259, affd, 221 N.Y. 707, 117 N.E. 1082 (1914) (holder of a
preferential right gets only one chance; if he declines, he loses the right in a subsequent sale).
109. See Jurgensen v. Morris, 194 App. Div. 92, 185 N.Y.S. 386 (1920); Superior Port-
land Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wash. 2d 169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949).
110. See Aldridge & Stroud, Inc. v. American-Canadian Oil & Drilling Corp., 235 Ark.
8, 357 S.W.2d 8 (1962); Nelson v. Reisner, 51 Cal. 2d 161, 331 P.2d 17 (1958); Barling v.
Horn, 296 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1956).
111. See generally Reasoner, supra note 10, at 73.
112. See Appendix, note f infra and accompanying text.
113. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1972).
114. 470 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
115. 256 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. Accord, Shell Oil Co. v. Blumberg, 154 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1946).
117. This, of course, raises restraint on alienation questions. See notes 23-34 supra and
accompanying text.
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sion and facing the holder in court." 8
The holder of the preferential right and the third party purchaser also
are subject to certain obligations. For instance, when the holder receives
notice that the owner is contemplating a sale of the burdened interest, he
must affirmatively offer to meet the terms of the provision." 9 Failure to
make this offer may not terminate the preferential right, however, if the
holder can show a valid excuse.'12  Additionally, payment or tender of
purchase money may be required within the period given to exercise the
preferential right.' 21 As for a third party purchaser, if he has actual or
constructive notice of a preferential right outstanding on the property, he
may be obligated to make reasonable inquiries to determine whether the
owner's obligations under the provision have been met or face the possibil-
ity of being held liable to the holder of the right. 122
B. Remedies
The alternative remedies in the event of a breach of a preferential right
provision in a multi-interest transaction have been previously consid-
ered. 23  This discussion, therefore, refers to breaches in the individual
sale of the burdened interest. As a rule, a court will grant the holder of a
preferential right some form of legal redress, such as specific performance,
injunctions restraining sale, orders requiring reconveyance, or damages, if
the right is breached.124 Where only the burdened interest is involved, the
holder can usually obtain specific performance from the owner or from a
transferee who took with actual or constructive notice of the preferential
right.125 When the transferee does not have actual or constructive notice,
however, the holder may be limited to a damage action against the trans-
feror. 1 26  Thus, the holder of a preferential right should always make cer-
tain that it is recorded. In addition to specific performance, the holder
may also sue for damages occasioned by the breach. For example, in Nel-
118. Other problems concerning multi-interest deals have been previously discussed.
See notes 91-105 supra and accompanying text.
119. Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Mathews
v. Kingsley, 100 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
120. Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See
also 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 355 (1964).
121. See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1976).
122. See Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
123. See notes 91-105 supra and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Nelson v. Reisner, 51 Cal. 2d 161, 168, 331 P.2d 17, 22 (1958) (damages);
Schwartz v. Shapiro, 229 Cal. App. 2d 238, 40 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1964) (specific perform-
ance); New Atd. Garden, Inc. v. Atlantic Garden Realty Corp., 201 App. Div. 404, 194
N.Y.S. 34, 40 (1922), aj/'d, 237 N.Y. 541, 143 N.E. 734 (1923) (injunctive relief); L.E. Wal-
lach, Inc. v. Toll, 381 Pa. 423, 113 A.2d 258, 260 (1955) (reconveyance); First Nat'l Bank v.
Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 764, 771 (1937) (specific performance).
125. See Barling v. Horn, 296 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1956); Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724,
735-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stone v. Tigner, 165 S.W.2d 124(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, writ refd).
126. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 8, § 428.3.
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son v. Reisner127 damages were awarded for loss of anticipated profits.
Additionally, the injured holder could seek damages for the disruption of
joint operations if such occurs. One court has allowed damages which
accrued between the date of the wrongful conveyance and the date of spe-
cific performance.128 Finally, those courts which grant specific perform-
ance would also be likely to grant injunctive relief when appropriate.
C. Defenses
Since many of the suits arising from the breach of a preferential right
provision seek equitable relief, equitable defenses such as laches and un-
clean hands apply. The most often used is laches, the equitable counter-
part of a statute of limitations. As a general rule, courts are quick to apply
the doctrine of laches when there is a substantial change in the value of
property, 29 which is an especially germane consideration in oil and gas
transactions. 130 Delay caused by the owner of the burdened interest, how-
ever, and not by the holder of the right, would not support the defense.' 3 ,
Also, it must be remembered that equitable defenses are considered af-




Preferential right provisions can provide important benefits in oil and
gas transactions. Care must be taken when drafting such provisions to
assure that they are valid, and that they will apply to all the transactions
desired by the parties. The following checklist should be helpful when
drafting a preferential right provision:
A. Validity: Does the provision comply with the requirements of:
(a) the Statute of Frauds,
(b) the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, and
(c) the Rule Against Perpetuities?
B. Applicability: To exactly what transactions do the parties intend
the right to apply:
(a) What "sales" will trigger the provision?
(b) Will the provision apply in the event of:
(i) exchanges?
127. 51 Cal. 2d 161, 331 P.2d 17 (1958). The court rejected an argument that the dam-
ages were too speculative since the owner of the interest had created the situation by his own
misconduct. 331 P.2d at 23-24.
128. Courseview v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 158 Tex. 397, 415, 312 S.W.2d 197, 210
(1957).
129. See Collier v. Caraway, 140 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940, writ
ref'd); Minchew v. Morris, 241 S.W. 215, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1922, no writ).
130. See Aldridge & Stroud, Inc. v. American-Canadian Oil & Drilling Corp., 235 Ark.
8, 357 S.W.2d 8, 11 (1962) (two-year delay before holder of preferential right protested held
to bar action by laches---"values change rapidly in oil and gas matters"); accord, Panuco Oil
Leases, Inc. v. Conroe Drilling Co., 202 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
131. See Courseview v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 158 Tex. 397, 312 S.W.2d 197 (1957).
132. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.' 1964); Foster v.




(iii) sale of a nonoperating interest?
(iv) multi-interest sales?
(v) mergers?
C. What form of notice is required and when must it be made?
D. What remedies will be available and what damages can be recov-
ered if the provision is breached?
If careful attention is given to drafting a provision that accurately covers
all the intentions of the parties, the possibility of ambiguity and resulting
litigation can be substantially reduced.
APPENDIX
The following is a sample preferential right provision tailored for use in
a joint operating agreement and designed to provide maximum protection
for the holders of Mhe right.
Preferential Right to Purchase
1. Should any party desire to sell or dispose of all or any part of its
operating or nonoperating" interests under this agreement, or its rights
and interests in the Contract Area, it shall promptly give written notice
to the other party(s), sent by registered mail to the address(es) stated
elsewhere in this instrument,' with full information concerning its pro-
posed sale, which shall include the name and address of the prospective
purchaser, who must be ready, willing, and able to purchase, the
purchase price, and all other terms of the offer. The other party(s) shall
then have an absolute c optional prior right, for a period of ten (10)
days' after receipt of the notice, to purchase the subject interest upon
the same terms and conditionse contained in the third party's offer to
purchase, provided that if the terms and conditions of the offer include
as part or all of the consideration to be given by the prospective pur-
chaser an instrument evidencing the indebtedness of said purchaser,
then the other party(s), if they wish to exercise this preferential right
upon such terms and conditions, must meet the same standard of credit
worthiness as required of the prospective purchaserf If this preferential
right is not exercised, and the announced sale is not consummated, the
preferential right shall remain in effect, equally applicable to any future
sale.- If the preferential right is exercised by more than one of the pref-
erential right holders, the purchasing parties shall share the purchased
a. The inclusion of the sale of a nonoperating interest, such as an overriding royalty
interest, is optional. The parties' intention as to this are controlling. See note 90 supra and
accompanying text.
. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
c. This emphasizes the fact that the preferential right may be exercised within the
period given even if the third party offer is withdrawn. See notes 113-14 supra and accom-
panying text.
d The length of the "option period" is left to the discretion of the parties.
e. This meets the general Statute of Frauds requirement of a certain determination of
price. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
f. See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text.
g. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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interest in the proportions that the interest of each bears to the total
interest of all purchasing parties.
2. Transactions that shall be considered a sale or disposition invoking
this provision include but are not limited to:
(a) An exchange of the interest for other property," provided that in
such a situation if the other party(s) wish to exercise this preferential
right, the price that they shall pay shall be the fair market value of the
property proposed to be exchanged;
(b) judicial sales;'
(c) sales by the administrator of the estate of one of the parties;]
(d) liquidation sales upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of one of the
parties; k
(e) sale or disposition of all or any part of any parties' interests as
part of a "package-deal" multi-interest transaction.' In the event that
the other party() wish to exercise this right in such a situation the
purchase price shall be determined by ;m and
(f) mergers not covered by paragraph 3(c) of this clause."
3. There shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases where
any party wishes:
(a) to mortgage its interest, provided that this preferential right pro-
vision shall be applicable to any resulting mortgage foreclosure sale;'
(b) to enter into production payment financing by conveying an in-
terest to a production payment owner for funds to be used to develop
the properties; or
(c) to dispose of its interest by merger, reorganization, consolidation,
or sale of all or substantially all of its assets to a subsidiary or parent
company, to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in
which any one party owns a majority of the stock, provided that the
new owner of the interest shall be subject to this preferential right
provision.P
There shall also be no preferential right to purchase in cases of:
(a) donative transfers, provided that the donee shall be subject to this
h. In a jurisdiction such as Texas, where a valid preferential right provision may run
with the land, drafting the provision so that exchanges are not triggering transactions may be
satisfactory, since the preferential right will still apply. Nevertheless, it is best to include
exchanges as triggering transactions for two reasons. First, if in a jurisdiction in which a
valid preferential right clause must be considered personal, an exchange completely frus-
trates the right. See notes 63-68 supra and accompanying text. Secondly, even in jurisdic-
tions where the provision is not personal and passes with the exchanged interest, the
proposed new owner may be unacceptable to the other parties. See note 10 supra and
accompanying text.
i. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
j: See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
k. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
I. This statement shows the parties' clear intentions as to the applicability of the pro-
vision to package deals, and avoids problems with the Rule Against Restraints on Aliena-
tion. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
m. The parties should decide upon an acceptable method to determine the price to be
accorded the burdened interest. Possible methods include third party determination, mu-
tual agreement subject to third party arbitration, and pro rata allocation.
n. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
o. See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
p. This proviso should not be included in a jurisdiction where it is held that a prefer-
ential right provision that runs with the land is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
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preferential right provision; q
(b) granting of easements;r or
(c) condemnation sales..
[4. This provision does not run with the land and is personal to the
parties to this agreement.]'
5. In the event of a sale or disposition which invokes this provision by
Operator of the interests owned by it which are subject hereto, the hold-
ers of a majority interest in the premises subject hereto shall be entitled
to select a new operator, but unless such selection is made within ten(10) days after the sale or disposition is finalized the transferee of the
present Operator shall act as operator hereunder.
q. Id See also notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
r. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
s. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
t. This statement should only be included in those jurisdictions where a nonpersonal
provision would be considered violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities. See notes 36-41
supra and accompanying text. If it is used, be certain that there are no contradictory provi-
sions elsewhere in the clause. See, e.g., notes hfp & q supra and accompanying text. In
any other jurisdiction, such as Texas, this statement should not be used.
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